Behavioral Economics
Games involving trust, fairness, and social preferences.
Ultimatum Game
One player proposes a split; the other accepts or rejects.
game UltimatumGame {
players Proposer, Responder
strategies Fair, Unfair, Accept, Reject
// Proposer: Fair (50-50) or Unfair (90-10)
// Responder: Accept or Reject
payoff Proposer {
(Fair, Accept): 50 // Fair split accepted
(Fair, Reject): 0 // Fair split rejected (spite?)
(Unfair, Accept): 90 // Greedy split accepted
(Unfair, Reject): 0 // Greedy split rejected
}
payoff Responder {
(Fair, Accept): 50 // Get fair share
(Fair, Reject): 0 // Reject fair (irrational)
(Unfair, Accept): 10 // Accept small share
(Unfair, Reject): 0 // Reject unfair offer
}
}
Economic prediction: Responder accepts any positive offer.
Behavioral reality: Unfair offers are often rejected.
Trust Game
Player 1 can trust (send money), Player 2 can reciprocate or betray.
game TrustGame {
players Investor, Trustee
strategies Trust, NoTrust, Return, Keep
// Investor sends $10, it triples to $30
// Trustee can return $15 (split) or keep all
payoff Investor {
(Trust, Return): 15 // Investment + return
(Trust, Keep): 0 // Betrayed
(NoTrust, Return): 10 // Kept original
(NoTrust, Keep): 10 // Kept original
}
payoff Trustee {
(Trust, Return): 15 // Fair split
(Trust, Keep): 30 // Betray (keep all)
(NoTrust, Return): 0 // Nothing to return
(NoTrust, Keep): 0 // Nothing to keep
}
}
Nash Equilibrium: (NoTrust, Keep) — but this is socially inefficient.
Dictator Game
One player unilaterally decides the split.
game DictatorGame {
players Dictator, Recipient
strategies Generous, Selfish, Accept, Accept2
// Dictator has all power
// Recipient can only accept
payoff Dictator {
(Generous, Accept): 50
(Generous, Accept2): 50
(Selfish, Accept): 100
(Selfish, Accept2): 100
}
payoff Recipient {
(Generous, Accept): 50
(Generous, Accept2): 50
(Selfish, Accept): 0
(Selfish, Accept2): 0
}
}
Economic prediction: Dictator keeps everything.
Behavioral reality: Many dictators share 20-30%.
Public Goods Game
N players decide whether to contribute to a public good.
game PublicGoods2P {
players Player1, Player2
strategies Contribute, FreeRide
// Each contribution costs 10, generates 8 for each player
// Total benefit = 16, but I only get 8
payoff Player1 {
(Contribute, Contribute): 6 // 16 - 10 = 6
(Contribute, FreeRide): -2 // 8 - 10 = -2
(FreeRide, Contribute): 8 // Free benefit
(FreeRide, FreeRide): 0 // No public good
}
payoff Player2 {
(Contribute, Contribute): 6
(FreeRide, Contribute): -2
(Contribute, FreeRide): 8
(FreeRide, FreeRide): 0
}
}
Nash Equilibrium: Both free-ride — the tragedy of rational self-interest.
Next Steps
- Political Economy → — Arms races, commons, and collective action